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Response to Alban Bouvier 
 
 
 
By/Par     John B. Davis        _ 
 
 
 
  
I thank Alban Bouvier for his thoughtful comments and for attending my March 2005 Paris 
lectures at Université de Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne Maison des Sciences Economiques 
which provided us the opportunity to discuss his comments.  We seem now to be in 
agreement on most points, and I believe have reached a better understanding of the issues he 
has raised in his comments. 
 
Bouvier has emphasized that methodological individualism is a versatile doctrine which can 
accommodate a variety of positions regarding approaches which emphasize individuals.  It is 
not to be confused with ontological individualism, he emphasizes, which makes strong 
claims about the existence of individuals and often about the non-existence of other types of 
entities.  In this regard, Bouvier follows Schumpeter, who I cited (Davis, pp. 35-6) as 
making essentially this same distinction.  My main target in the first half of my book, 
however, was atomistic ontological individualist views, and I am not only not a critic of all 
methodological individualist views, but can even be seen as advancing a methodological 
individualism throughout the book and especially in the second half where I present the 
socially embedded individual conception as stronger than the atomist conception.   
 
Thus the book is not methodologically holist as is charged.  In fact, I argue that 
methodological holism has been something of a blind alley for heterodox economics (pp. 
109ff), and that recent structure-agent models which allow for reciprocal influences of 
individuals and structures on one another represent an advance over the weaknesses in 
methodological holism regarding the role of individuals in the social process – something 
which has often been caricatured by opponents of the view.  Structure-agent models, it 
should be added, are neither methodological individualist or methodological holist.  If my 
book can be seen as methodological individualist with respect to the socially embedded 
individual conception, then it is to emphasize this side of the structure-agent framework – 
which in my view is underdeveloped – not to abandon that framework. 
 
Methodological holism enters my discussion at one other point.  In my discussion of the 
problem of multiple selves in the standard literature (chapter 4), I point out that not only has 
this problem never been adequately addressed within the confines the standard assumptions, 
but that if one is to remain steadfast in a traditional methodological individualist view with 
ontological individualist foundations, then one is implicitly committed to a methodological 
holism regarding an individual’s multiple selves being united in one person (p. 69).  The 
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general problem in this chapter was the individuation problem or how one goes about 
showing that the standard conception of the individual demonstrates the individual to be 
separate and distinct from other individuals.  In connection with multiple selves, the problem 
is that without knowing how an individual’s many selves count as one, one does not know 
where one individual begins and ends or how to count individuals.  I argue that having failed 
to solve this problem standard economics has found itself left with an abstract individual 
conception, which concerns individuals distinct in name only.  That is, the usual utility 
objective function approach used in economics modeling can be equally used for one or 
more individuals, and thus includes nothing in it which tells us whether it applies to one or 
more individuals.  More simply, there is nothing in the abstract individual conception that 
tells us whether it refers to anything in the world at all. 
 
Thus I disagree with Bouvier that methodological individualism is general in the sense that it 
takes its departure from a very abstract conception of the individual.  Methodological 
individualism represents a strategy that emphasizes individuals, but on my view one can only 
emphasize them if one can be confident one is talking about real world human individuals.  
In the introductory first chapter of my book I argue that an ontological approach to 
evaluating conceptions of entities in economics requires an account of the semantics of 
reference (pp. 15-16) in order that one be able to say that the terms one employs can be 
reasonably said to pick out real things in the world.  The account of reference I employ is 
what I referred to as an identity conditions approach that looks at a given ontological concept 
(here, the individual), asks what the requirements are for using that concept (here, 
individuation and re-identification), and then evaluates particular conceptions (here, the 
atomistic and embedded individual conceptions) according to whether they satisfy those 
requirements.  When this is the case, the conception in question can be said to refer to real 
things in the world.  The abstract individual conception, however, can be used equally to 
refer to one or more individuals (or even animals or computers).  Thus its generality 
precludes its satisfying the individuation requirement, and as a conception it floats free of the 
world it is meant to describe. 
 
One other point of disagreement between Bouvier and me deserves comment.  He asserts 
that he finds my treatment of collective intentionality as heterodox puzzling, because Raimo 
Tuomela’s discussion on which I rely is clearly individualistic rather than holistic.  But as 
noted above, my book is not meant to be methodologically holist but individualist, at least 
with respect to the embedded individual conception.  Thus Tuomela’s account was chosen 
intentionally because of being strongly individualist.  My strategy on this score was to avoid 
other contributors to collective intentionality theory such as Margaret Gilbert who are less 
individualist than Tuomela in order to offer for a highly individualist contemporary 
economics a clear comparison between two different accounts of the individual.  Bouvier 
may be right that this is not what one expects of heterodox economics, but I think I provided 
good evidence (pp. 117ff) that traditional heterodox approaches take a position on this matter 
not unlike the one I take.   
 
Thus the statement Bouvier finds awkward – that social relationships are embedded in 
individuals (p. 130) rather than the idea that individuals are embedded in social relationships 
– was specifically chosen to emphasize that individuals could be both social and nonetheless 
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still individual.  As the collective intentionality discussion I develop then explains, use of 
‘we’ language is fully the individual’s own use, though it also possesses a distinctively social 
aspect.  In this sense, social relationships are embedded in individuals rather than the reverse. 
 
There are other minor points of difference between Alban Bouvier and myself, but on the 
whole – particularly after our recent discussions – I find a remarkable amount of agreement 
between us.  I thank him again for his engaged reading of the book.  
